Hiding variables when decomposing specifications into GR(1) contracts by Filippidis, Ioannis & Murray, Richard M.
Hiding variables when decomposing specifications into GR(1) contracts
Ioannis Filippidis and Richard M. Murray
Abstract—We propose a method for eliminating variables
from component specifications during the decomposition of
GR(1) properties into contracts. The variables that can be
eliminated are identified by parameterizing the communication
architecture to investigate the dependence of realizability on the
availability of information. We prove that the selected variables
can be hidden from other components, while still expressing
the resulting specification as a game with full information with
respect to the remaining variables. The values of other variables
need not be known all the time, so we hide them for part
of the time, thus reducing the amount of information that
needs to be communicated between components. We improve
on our previous results on algorithmic decomposition of GR(1)
properties, and prove existence of decompositions in the full
information case. We use semantic methods of computation
based on binary decision diagrams. To recover the constructed
specifications so that humans can read them, we implement
exact symbolic minimal covering over the lattice of integer
orthotopes, thus deriving minimal formulae in disjunctive
normal form over integer variable intervals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before we build a system, usually we make a design.
Specifying a system rarely happens as one step. Starting
from a coarse problem description, it is iteratively divided
into smaller problems that are more detailed, but also more
specific and local in nature. This decomposition involves
distributing functionality among components, and creating
interfaces between them. Part of the reason that we de-
compose is to focus and isolate. We want to focus on
each subsystem separately, and isolate the reasoning about
one subsystem from another [1], to the extent that their
dependency on each other allows. So, we want to omit
details about other components. A component’s behavior is
represented mathematically by variables, so this means that
we want to eliminate external variables from the specification
of any given component. Why did we write those variables
in the first place, if we were going to invest effort in omitting
them? Because we can more easily express what behavior we
want from a collection of components by letting ourselves
refer freely to the variables that model them.
In this paper, we study the problem of eliminating vari-
ables during the decomposition of specifications into assume-
guarantee contracts between components. In order to de-
tect which variables each component needs to know about,
we use parameters that prescribe whether each variable is
hidden or not. This can be regarded as parameterizing the
information communicated between components. This allows
computing whether an assume-guarantee contract of the form
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we studied in [2] exists, as a function of the communication
architecture. A specific architecture is then selected, and the
properties decomposed. We prove that variables selected to
be hidden can be eliminated from the resulting specifications,
while still writing them without temporal quantifiers [3].
Thus, we hide information without creating games with
partial information at lower levels. This is motivated by the
computational hardness that partial information introduces
[4], [5], [6], even for linear temporal logic specifications in
the GR(1) fragment [7]. A control function that implements
a realizable GR(1) specification can be constructed in time
polynomial in the number of states (which is exponential
in the number of variables). We improve on our previous
assumption construction algorithm by accounting for candi-
date assumptions of a component during the construction
of guarantess for the components that will ensure those
assumptions, thus computing GR(1) decompositions in cases
the previous approach resulted in nesting [2]. In addition,
we prove that in presence of full information, the previous
approach can be used to always find GR(1) contracts (without
nesting).
The idea of using masks as parameters originates from
the work of Pnueli, Klein, and Piterman on approximating
asynchronous synthesis with GR(1) synthesis [5], [8] using
Rosner’s reduction. Parameterization of safety and reachabil-
ity goals, and bounded compositional synthesis with partial
information have been studied recently in [9]. The approach
proposed here can be viewed as a way to avoid constructing
estimators [4] at lower levels, and automatically eliminating
variables from the specifications. Synthesis of almost-sure
winning sensing strategies in order to avoid synthesis under
partial information has been studied in [10].
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. II introduces
relevant preliminaries from logic. We develop in Sec. III
the parameterization of communication, and elimination of
variables, in Sec. IV the computation of assumptions and
guarantees for decomposition, improve in Sec. V on previous
results in the full information case, and discuss an example
in Sec. VI, with conclusions in Sec. VII.
II. OPEN SYSTEMS AND LOGIC
A. Logic and set theory
We use the (raw) temporal logic of actions (TLA+) [3],
with some minor modifications that accommodate for a
smoother connection to the literature on games. TLA+ is
based on Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory, which is re-
garded as a foundation for mathematics. Every entity in
TLA+ is a set (also called a “value”). A function f is a set
with the property that, for every x ∈ DOMAIN f , we know
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what value f [x ] is. Functions can be defined with the syntax
f ! [x ∈ S "→ e], where e some suitable expression [3,
p.303, p.71]. For any x /∈ DOMAIN f , f [x ] is some value,
unspecified by the axioms of TLA+. The collection of func-
tions with domain S and range R ⊆ T forms a set, denoted
by [S → T ]. An operator g(x ) is a mapping, defined by
some expression, with no domain specified. Brackets instead
of parentheses distinguish a function from an operator. Un-
named operators are built with the construct LAMBDA [11],
which we abbreviate by λ (as in λ-calculus). The notation
F (x ,G( )) denotes an operator F that takes as arguments a
nullary operator x and a unary operator G [3, §17.1.1]. Nat
denotes the set of natural numbers [3, §18.6, p.348], and
0..n ! {i ∈ Nat : 0 ≤ i ∧ i ≤ n}. A function with domain
1..n for some n ∈ Nat is called a tuple and denoted with
angle brackets, for example ⟨a, b ⟩. Quantification can be
bounded, as in the formula ∀ x ∈ S : P(x ), or unbounded,
as in ∀ x : P(x ). The former is defined in terms of the latter
as ∀ x ∈ S : P(x ) ∆= ∀ x : (x ∈ S ) ⇒ P(x ). So the
“bound” is essentially a suitable antecedent. The operator ∧
denotes conjunction, ∨ disjunction, ¬ negation. Substitution
of expression e1 for (a rigid or flexible) variable x in the
expression e is expressed with LET x ∆= e1 IN e .
Game solving involves reasoning about sets of states. Sym-
bolic methods using binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [12]
are used for compactly representing sets of states, instead
of enumeration. To use BDDs for specifications in untyped
logic we need to identify relevant (integer) values from type
invariants that appear in the formulas. This information is
used as type hints to automatically rewrite the problem in
terms of new variables so that all relevant values be Boolean
(instead of integer), thus enabling use of BDDs. This process
is called bitblasting and is analogous to program compilation.
More details can be found in [13].
Semantics of modal logic: Temporal logic serves for
reasoning about dynamics, because it is interpreted over
sequences of states. A state s is an assignment of values
to all variables. A step is a pair of states ⟨s1, s2 ⟩, and a
behavior σ is an infinite sequence of states, i.e., a function
from N to states. An action (state predicate) is a Boolean-
valued formula over steps (states). Given a step ⟨s1, s2 ⟩,
the formulae x and x ′ denote the values s1!x " and s2!x ",
respectively. We will use the temporal operators: ✷ “always”
and ✸ “eventually”. If formula f is TRUE in every (some)
state of behavior σ, then σ |= ✷f (σ |= ✸f ) is TRUE.
Formal semantics are defined in [3, §16.2.4]. If a property
ϕ cannot distinguish between two behaviors that differ only
by repetition of states, then ϕ is called stutter-invariant. If
for any behavior σ, σ ̸|= ϕ implies that ∃n ∈ Nat such
that the finite subsequence front(σ,n) ! [i ∈ 0..n "→ σ[i ]]
cannot be extended to satisfy ϕ, then ϕ is a safety property.
If for any behavior σ ̸|= ϕ implies that ∀n ∈ Nat :
front(σ,n) can be extended to satisfy ϕ, then ϕ is a liveness
property. A property of the form ✷✸p (✸✷p) is called
recurrence (persistence). Due to TLA+ semantics, formulae
define collections of sets that are not sets (they are proper
classes). For simplicity, we still discuss about “sets” of
states. Restricting attention to only variables declared in
a given specification leads to this viewpoint too. Different
components can observe different variables, giving rise to
local state. This is simpler to discuss using suitable state
predicates, instead of assignments to subsets of variables.
B. Assume-guarantee properties and contracts
An open system is one constrained with respect to vari-
ables it does not control. We use component and player
interchangeably. Specifying a component should not con-
strain its environment. This is expressible with an assume-
guarantee formula that spreads implication incrementally
over a behavior [14], [15], [16]. We use the form [2]
AsmGrnt(Init ,EnvNext ,SysNext ,Liveness)
∆
=
Init ⇒ ∧ ✷(Earlier(EnvNext)⇒ SysNext)
∧ (✷EnvNext)⇒ Liveness
(1)
which is a modification of [16] to avoid circularity. Earlier
abbreviates the past LTL operators WeakPrevious and
Historically composed (expressible in TLA+ using temporal
quantification and history variables)–its definition can be
omitted here.
Synthesis of implementations: A temporal property can
be less specific than the final implementation. Synthesis
is the algorithmic construction of a controller that ensures
the component satifies a given temporal property. Let x be
uncontrolled and y controlled variables, and
Realization(f , g ,mem0)
∆
=
(mem = mem0) ∧✷∧ y ′ = f [⟨mem, x , y ⟩]
∧ mem ′ = g [⟨mem, x , y ⟩]
where IsFiniteSet requires finite cardinality [3, p.341].
Assume that ϕ is a temporal logic formula over vari-
ables x , y but not the memory variable mem . An imple-
mentation (program, circuit, etc.) of ϕ is a pair ⟨f , g ⟩
of a controller function f and a memory update func-
tion g , and an initial memory value mem0, such that
|= ∧ IsAFunction(f ) ∧ IsFiniteSet(DOMAIN f )
∧ IsAFunction(g) ∧ IsFiniteSet(DOMAIN g)
∧ Realization(f , g ,mem0)⇒ ϕ
(|= means
TRUE for all behaviors σ). We denote existence of an
implementation with IsRealizable(j ,ϕ), where j identifies
the component (so x , y). A formal TLA+ definition is pos-
sible [17], [18] but the above suffices here.
A formula of the form
∨
j ∈ 1..m✸✷P j∨
∧
i ∈ 1..n✷✸Ri
describes a liveness property categorized as generalized
Streett(1), or GR(1) [7]. Synthesis for ϕ as in Eq. (1) with
GR(1) Liveness has complexity polynomial in the number
of (relevant) states, thus GR(1) is preferred to GR(k) or LTL.
Contracts: We will be discussing the decomposition
of a temporal property ϕ into multiple properties that are
realizable by a collection of components. A contract is a
partition of variables among players in 1..n and a collection
of properties ψ1, ..,ψn such that [2]
|=
∧
j∈1..nIsRealizable(j ,ψj ) ∧
(
(
∧
j∈1..nψj ) ⇒ ϕ
)
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In other words, a contract is a collection of assume-guarantee
properties for each component that are realizable and con-
joined imply the desired behavior for the system assembled
from those components. The index j is notation in the
metatheory, not within the object theory TLA+ [19].
The specifications we consider are interleaving, in that
they allow only variables of one component to change in
each step (a “move”). Components move in a fixed order
that repeats (a turn-based game).
Elements of synthesis algorithms: Computing attractors
is fundamental to reasoning about open systems. An attractor
is the set of states from where a controller exists that can
guide the system to a desired set of states. It answers the
“multi-step” control problem, and can be computed as the
least fixpoint of an operation that involves the controllable
predecessor operator CPre, which answers the “one-step”
control problem [20]. In a turn-based game with full infor-
mation, CPre in the system’s turn is
SysPr(x , y) ! ∃ yˆ : SysNxt(x , y , yˆ) ∧ Target(x , yˆ)
EnvPr(x , y) ! ∀ xˆ : EnvNxt(x , y , xˆ )⇒ Target(xˆ , y)(2)
A state satisfies CPre if x , y take values in that state such
that the system can choose a next move yˆ allowed by
SysNext , and any next environment move xˆ that EnvNext
allows leads to the given Target states.
III. HIDING VARIABLES
A. Motivation and overview
A hierarchical approach that omits details at the high
level is one way to reduce the computational cost of de-
composition. After decomposition, we can introduce the
omitted details at lower levels. Clearly, those details should
be irrelevant to the higher level design. To prefer this ap-
proach, the subproblems must be simpler and the synthesized
specifications and understandable by humans. In this section
we eliminate variables that leave component realizability
unaffected, to simplify the subproblems. For variables that
cannot be entirely eliminated because they provide useful
information at some phases of execution, we apply the same
method to eliminate them locally, depending on the current
objective, and so reduce how much information needs to
be communicated between components at any single time.
We also implement symbolic minimal covering to simplify
the generated contract specifications so that humans can
read them, as described later. Knowing a variable’s value
is information. Quantification hides a variable’s value, de-
stroying some information. If a component specification’s
implementation can work without knowing a variable’s value,
then that value doesn’t need to be communicated at runtime,
motivating the following.
Problem 1 (Hiding variables): Given a realizable
assume-guarantee GR(1) formula ϕ with one recurrence pair
(memory embedded in state space), and a finite collection
of component variables, which environment variables can be
universally quantified (hidden from the component) without
preventing the component from realizing ϕ?
A temporal formula describes how its free variables be-
have. Hidden variables are bound by quantifiers, but they
still need to be reasoned about, unless entirely eliminated
from a (sub)formula. We want the decomposition step to
remove irrelevant details, in order to create space for adding
relevant finer details to each component’s specification. In
other words, simplify before adding more, motivating the
following.
Problem 2 (Expressibility): Can we write the component
specifications so that hidden variables not occur in the
resulting formulas, and define an assume-guarantee GR(1)
property without hidden variables (thus with full information
wrt the variables declared in the component specification)?
B. Shared invariant as safety assumption
We will quantify variables universally to hide them. In
this section x , h denote uncontrolled (environment) variables
and y controlled (component) variables. Suppose P(x , y , h)
is a predicate where we want to hide variable h . If we
use unbounded quantification, ∀ h : P(x , y , h), then in
most cases the result will be impractically restrictive (too
conservative), or FALSE. We should instead introduce a state
predicate as antecedent to bound h . For that we use a global
(“shared”) invariant, as is common practice in reasoning
about distributed algorithms [21]. The weakest invariant
that works in the full information case is the collection of
cooperatively winning states [2], [22], and is unique. Let
Inv(x , y , h) denote this invariant, computed as the states
from where a centralized player would have a winning
control strategy [2, §III-A]. Let us introduce this invariant
as an antecedent, in order to bound the variable x that is a
candidate for hiding.
C. Hiding variables
A state predicate that at a higher level appears as an an-
tecedent (assumption) in an open system (assume-guarantee)
property can at a lower level be integrated into the environ-
ment and system action formulas of the open system property
at that lower level. The variable i tracks the player whose
turn it is to move, thus expressing the modeling assumption
of interleaving. For readability below i is omitted. Finer
detail can be found in [13] and implementation code. The
component can safely step from a state s1
∆
= [x "→
a, y "→ b, h "→ c] to a state s2 ∆= [x "→ a, y "→ y ′, h "→ c]
that satisfies the predicate Target(x , y ′, h) without observing
variable h if
SysCPre(x , y)
∆
= ∃ y ′ : ∀ h :
Inv(x , y , h) ⇒ ∧ SysNext(x , y , h, y ′)
∧ Target(x , y ′, h)
(3)
Writing ∃ y ′ is abuse of TLA+ syntax in the metatheory, for
readability. (In our case SysNext implies Inv(x , y ′, h) from
taking cooperative closure.) The variable h is hidden due to
the (linear in first-order logic) order of quantifiers that forces
the choice of y ′ unknowing of h . The component can be sure
that the environment is necessarily stepping from state s1 to
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a state s3
∆
= [x "→ x ′, y "→ b, h "→ h ′] that satisfies the
predicate Target(x ′, y , h ′) if
EnvCPre(x , y)
∆
= ∀ x ′, h ′ : ∀ h :
Target(x ′, y , h ′) ∨ ¬∧ Inv(x , y , h)
∧ EnvNext(x , y , h, x ′, h ′)
(4)
(In our case EnvNext implies Inv(x ′, y , h ′) from taking
cooperative closure.) If the objective Target(x , y , h) is in-
dependent of variable h , then we can arrange Eq. (3) as
λx , y : ∃ y ′ : ∧ ∀ h : ∨ ¬Inv(x , y , h)
∨ SysNext(x , y , h, y ′)
∧ Target(x , y ′)
(5)
and Eq. (4) as
λx , y : ∀ x ′ : ∨ ¬ ∃ h, h ′ : ∧ Inv(x , y , h)
∧ EnvNext(x , y , h, x ′, h ′)
∨ Target(x ′, y)
(6)
D. Parameterizing the communication architecture
Which variables can we hide (Sec. III-C) without sacrific-
ing realizability? Instead of enumerating the combinations
of variables that can be hidden, we parameterize which
variables are hidden or not. For each variable, a mask
variable m is introduced that “routes” the variable to take
a visible or hidden value Mask(m, v , h) ∆= IF (m =
TRUE) THEN h ELSE v We can thus model the availability
or lack of information. Substitute this selector expression
for the tentatively hidden variable in Eq. (3) to obtain
λx , y , v ,m : ∃ y ′ : ∀ h : LET r ∆= Mask(m, v , h)
IN ∨ ¬Inv(x , y , r)
∨ ∧ SysNext(x , y , r , y ′)
∧ Target(x , y ′, r ,m)
(7)
The idea of using masks as parameters originates from
work on approximating asynchronous synthesis with GR(1)
synthesis [5], [8].
λx , y , v ,m : ∀ h, h ′, x ′ :
LET r
∆
= Mask(m, v , h)
IN ∨ ¬∧ Inv(x , y , r)
∧ EnvNext(x , y , r , x ′, h ′)
∨ Target(x ′, y , h ′,m)
(8)
The previous formulas are from the viewpoint of the compo-
nent selected as the system. Similar formulas apply from the
viewpoint of a component that is part of the environment
above, but with a different mask variable in place of m .
A different mask is associated with each variable com-
municated between each pair of components. These masks
increase the number of Boolean variables in the symbolic
computation, but are not quantified during controllable prede-
cessor operations, and are Boolean-valued, whereas the vari-
ables they mask are integer-valued. With n components and
k (integer-valued) variables in total (over all components),
(n − 1)k Boolean mask variables are introduced. These
are parameters, so the number of reachable states remains
unchanged, and thus the same number of controllable prede-
cessor operations will be applied, and realizability fixpoints
take the same number of iterations, similarly to arguments
developed for parameterized synthesis [9]. The number of
components n involved in each decomposition step is ex-
pected to not be large, so that the design specification be
understandable by a human.
With this formulation, we can parameterize what infor-
mation is available to each player. The masks parameterize
the communication architecture, and allow for computing
symbolically those architectures that allow for decomposing
the high-level specification into a contract. We can think of
the above scheme as a sensitivity analysis of the problem
with respect to the communication architecture.
Can we eliminate hidden variables from component spec-
ifications? This requires writing the system and environment
actions that are computed for each component with formulas
that do not contain quantification. The eliminated variables
do not appear in the component specification, so further work
focusing on that component can be carried out in a full
information context, including GR(1) synthesis. (The usual
controllable predecessor operator can be used.)
Provided that goals in component specifications are ex-
pressed without mentioning any hidden variables (as de-
scribed later), Eqs. (5) and (6) imply that if the actions
SimplerSysNext ,SimplerEnvNext satisfy the axioms
|= SimplerSysNext(x , y , y ′) ≡
∀ h : Inv(x , y , h)⇒ SysNext(x , y , h, y ′)
|= SimplerEnvNext(x , y , x ′) ≡
∃ h, h ′ : Inv(x , y , h) ∧ EnvNext(x , y , h, x ′, h ′)
then these actions can be used in the full information
controllable predecessor, which in system and environment
turns takes the forms
λx , y : ∃ y ′ : SimplerSysNext(x , y , y ′) ∧ Target(x , y ′)
λx , y : ∀ x ′ : SimplerEnvNext(x , y , x ′)⇒ Target(x ′, y)
to obtain the same realizability and synthesis results with
Eqs. (5) and (6). This elimination enables further reasoning
for each component to be carried out as if the component
had full information about its environment. We implemented
the exact symbolic minimization method using branch and
bound as described in [23], but for the lattice of integer
orthotopes (hypperrectangles aligned to axes), instead of the
Boolean lattice. Using this approach, we express the BDDs
of SimplerSysNext and SimplerEnvNext as formulas over
integer variables. Independence from the hidden variable
h implies that only variables x , y , x ′, y ′ will occur in the
resulting formulas. Due to lack of space, the details of the
minimization will appear elsewhere. The implementation is
released in the package omega [24]. The Quine-McCluskey
minimization method, which takes exponential amount of
space and time, thus is impractical, has been used before for
simplifying Boolean logic expressions in manuals [25], robot
path planning among planar rectangles [26] and recently for
simplifying enumerated robot controllers [27].
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IV. DECOMPOSITION INTO A GR(1) CONTRACT
The decomposition algorithm works by finding recurrence
assumptions (✷✸) for a player and corresponding guarantees
for the other players, starting from a goal and reasoning
backwards. It is based on our algorithm for constructing
contracts in the presence of full information [2, Alg.1],
with mainly the following differences. The controllable
predecessor (CPre), fixpoint and other computations are
parameterized with respect to the communication between
the components, as described below and in Sec. III. Due
to the different information available to each component,
observability has to be taken into account, and an assumption
(by one player) that corresponds to a guarantee (by another
player) are each expressed using only variables visible to
each player. Another difference is the construction of as-
sumptions, which is described next.
The earlier algorithm [2, Alg.1] works as follows. Given
a goal g for player j , the attractor a ! Attr j (g) (states from
where j can guide the system to g) is computed, and then the
attractor b ! Attrk (a), where k a player other than j . The
next step is to find the control invariant subset of b from
where j can ensure the behavior either remains forever in
b, or eventually enters a ((✷b) ∨ ✸a). This set is called a
Trapj (b, a), and can be empty, even when our intuition as
specifiers would suggest otherwise, for the following reason.
States from where player k can reach a may exist (b non-
empty), but from all of them k may be able to exit b,
reaching states from where j can prevent k from reaching
a , by j going “backwards”. However, this backward motion
would lead to j satisfying the assumption we are about to
construct, which is what the specifier’s intuition suggests.
The algorithm we describe next takes this into account,
thus succeeding in finding assumptions in cases the earlier
approach could not (earlier, those resulted in a recursion,
where k became the “main” player from states not in b).
Following the transitions out of the “basin” b we can en-
large the basin, and use this as a temporary safety assumption
made by player k about player j remaining in the enlarged
basin. This enlargement is shown in Fig. 1 and is computed in
procedure MAKEPINFOASSUMPTION in Algo. 3. In our case
the decomposition works recursively with respect to teams
of players, starting with a player j and the rest in the set
Team playing as if they were one player moving in multiple
turns. Decomposition progresses by successively removing
players from a team, creating an acyclic graph of assumption
dependencies. Below we focus on the construction of each
assumption. More details can be found in an appendix [13]
and an implementation [28].
The main computation of assumptions that a Player can
make, and guarantees for other players in a Team that
imply the assumptions is Algo. 3, shown schematically
in Fig. 2. Spc stores information about the specification
(player actions, observer used to index masks, visible players
(unmasked)). This algorithm first attempts to find assump-
tions as described above. If a trap set does not exist, it
enlarges the basin by the set of states escape to where
the Team of players can force an exit in one step from
basin (Fig. 1). The result is a larger basin (Fig. 2). Player
j attempts to keep the behavior within the observable
subset Obs j (basin), unless it exists to a , from where j
can ensure the behavior reaches the observable subset of
the goal Obs j (g) (Obs(Goal ,Player ,Spc) in Algo. 3).
We are interested to ensure that if player j does not exit
Obs j (basin), then the Team can force a visit to some state
in G = ProjHiddenVrsteam(a) = ¬Obsteam(¬a) where
the hidden variables are with respect to the Team . This
set is the attractor ηteam = PinfoAttr team(G ,TmpSpc)
with parameterized communication and temporary safety
assumption in TmpSpc. Note that the objective is weakened,
because the Team does not need to observe whether a
has indeed been reached, player j is already doing so.
Moreover, a depends on variables of j that need not be
necessary information for Team to accomplish its objective.
Using Obsteam(a) instead of ¬Obsteam(¬a) would require
estimating the values of several player j variables (Obs is
defined below).
The set ¬ηteam is the candidate recurrence guarantee
for the Team . Player j will attempt to remain in bj =
Obs j (ηteam), which is a subset of Obs j (basin), thus the
temporary safety assumption of the Team will be implied
if player j has a trap. The Trapj (bj , a,Spc) contains those
states from where player j can force a visit to a , or remain
forever in bj . We can prove that the latter will not be the case,
provided that the Team does satisfy its guarantee to reach
¬ηteam , which is realizable by the Team because ηteam was
computed as the states from where the Team can force a visit
to G or force an exit from basin (|= ηteam ∧ G = FALSE).
We have outlined the proof of the following soundness result.
Theorem 3 (Soundness): For each assignment of values to
parameters (which corresponds to a communication architec-
ture) in the results of Algo. 3, if a recurrence goal ✷✸¬ηteam
for the team and a persistence goal ✸✷r for the component
have been found, then the recurrence goal is realizable by
the team, the (progress) goal (✸✷r) ∨ (✸a) realizable by
the player, and (✷✸¬ηteam)⇒ ¬✸✷r .
This theorem ensures that the player cannot prevent the
team from reaching G , neither stay forever in P , but can
ensure to reach S , if forced to exit P , which is what happens
as the team moves towards G . Therefore, progress of the
team can be utilized by the component to progress itself
towards its own recurrence objectives. Conversely, if the team
violates ✷✸G , then it cannot force an exit from P in any
way other than via S . The above algorithm is iterated to
find a (parameterized) greatest fixpoint. Multiple recurrence
goals for player j can be accounted for by conjunction of
the results from applying the algorithm to each goal. This
fixpoint nesting is arranged similarly to GR(1) synthesis [7],
with the difference that there are three alternations of least
and greatest fixpoints, so worst-case complexity of symbolic
implementation is a number of controllable predecessor calls
cubic in the number of states. In practice the latter number
is the diameter of the state space (the farthest two states can
be apart in number of transitions). It is interesting to observe
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Inv = Coop
a = PinfoAttrj (g)
g
basin = PinfoAttrteam (a)
escape
holes = ∧ PinfoCPreteam (out)
∧ basin
holes
escape = Post∃(holes ∧ Inv) ∧ out
out = ¬basin
Fig. 1: Collecting escapes that can cause a trap set to not
exist (simplified compared to Algo. 3).
that the temporary safety assumption has an objective similar
to notions used in modified logic semantics and fixpoint
computations of cooperative reactive synthesis [29].
As soon as a trap set is found for some parameter
values, those are “frozen” in further iterations, using the
variable converged to accumulate those values. Regarding
convergence we have the following.
Theorem 4 (Termination): ASSUME : Finite number of
states. PROVE : Algo. 3 terminates in a finite number of
iterations.
PROOF SKETCH: CASE |= escape = FALSE: satisfies the loop
guard. CASE |= escape ̸= FALSE: escape = out ∧ ... so
|= escape ⇒ ¬basin . Thus basin ∨ escape is strictly larger
than basin . So basin increases strictly as long as escape is
not equiv. to FALSE. basin is bounded above by the number
of states, thus the loop terminates.
In order for variable elimination to leave the winning set
computations unaffected, the Target in Eq. (5) should not
depend on h . This is ensured for the current player with a
parameterized static observer (mentioned above as Obs j ) that
assumes the shared invariant Inv Obs(Target( , , , )) ∆=
∀ h : LET r ∆= Mask(m, v , h) IN Inv(r , y , i) ⇒
Target(r , y ,m, i). This ensures that specifications of the
current player will be expressible using only visible vari-
ables, when we choose a communication architecture, i.e.,
after the parameteric contract construction has been com-
pleted. Static observation is similar to positional estimation
[4]. In our case the observers are parameterized by the
communication architecture.
Formally, parameters are TLA+ constants, also known as
rigid variables [3]. Parameterization has a “static” effect:
CPre quantifies only flexible variables, so the number of
quantified variables remains unchanged, and the diameter of
the state space in each “slice” obtained by fixing parameter
values is no larger than the cooperatively reachable state
space with full information. Similar observations apply to
parameterized goal set computations [9].
V. EXISTENCE OF GR(1) CONTRACTS IN THE
PRESENCE OF FULL INFORMATION
In previous work [2], we showed that a recurrence property
of the form ✷ρ1∧✷✸G for player 1 and safety ✷ρi for other
TmpSpc.Nextj action
a = PinfoAttrj (Obsj (g))
PinfoTrapj (bj , a,Spec)
basin (enlarged with escape)
ηteam = PinfoAttrteam (G,TmpSpc)
Obsj (g)
G = ProjHiddenVrsteam (a)
Obsj (basin)
bj = Obsj (ηteam ) g
Fig. 2: Finding assumptions by accounting for observability,
and collecting escapes to form auxiliary safety constraints
that the environment assumes, which represent that player j
will attempt to satisfy its persistence constraint.
Fig. 3: Algorithm for finding traps using temporary safety
assumptions with parameterized information availability.
def MAKEPINFOASSUMPTION(Goal ,Player ,Team,Spc) :
j : = Turn(Player), jp : = (j + 1)%Spc.n
Spc.visible : = {Player}, Spc.observer : = Player
TeamSpc : = Copy(Spc), TeamSpc.visible : = Team
TeamSpc.observer : = PICK p : p ∈ Team
a : = PinfoAttr(Obs(Goal ,Player ,Spc),Player)
basin : = PinfoAttr(A,Team,TeamSpc)
r , , basin : = MAKEPERSISTENCEASM(
a, basin,Player ,Team,Spc,TeamSpc)
escape : = TRUE, converged : = FALSE
while (¬ |= escape = FALSE) :
out : = ProjHiddenVrs(¬basin ∧ Inv ,TeamSpc)
holes : = basin ∧ PinfoCPre(out ,Team,TeamSpc)
escape : = out ∧ Post∃(holes ∧ Inv)
escape : = ∧ ProjHiddenVrs(escape,TeamSpc)
∧ out ∧ ¬converged
(* Enlarge *)
basin : = basin ∨ escape
obs basin : = Obs(basin,Player ,Spc)
stay : = (LET i
∆
= (j + 1)%Spc.n
x j
∆
= x ′j IN obs basin)
∧ (LET i ∆= j IN obs basin)
TmpSpec : = Copy(Spec)
(* Temporary safety assumption restricts Player action Next j *)
TmpSpec.Next j : = TmpSpec.Next j ∧ stay
r , ηteam , bteam : = MAKEPERSISTENCEASM(
a, basin,Player ,Team,Spc,TmpSpc)
converged : = converged ∨ NonEmptySlices(r)
return a, r , ηteam ,TmpSpc
def MAKEPERSISTENCEASM(
a, basin,Player ,Team,Spc,TmpSpc) :
G : = ProjHiddenVrs(a,TmpSpc)
bteam : = basin ∧ PinfoAttr(G ,Team,TmpSpc)
ηteam : = bteam ∧ ¬G
bj : = Obs j (ηteam ,Player ,Spc)
r : = ¬a ∧ PinfoTrap(bj , a, {Player},Spc)
return r , ηteam , bteam
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players (i ̸= 1) can be decomposed into a contract of assume-
guarantee properties with nested GR(1) properties as liveness
(for multiple recurrence goals memory can be embedded
a priori in the state space, since anyway introduced after
synthesis, because searching for memoryless controllers is
NP-complete [30]). The motivation for nested GR(1) was to
ensure that the conjunction of decomposed properties allows
all behaviors that are safe for the original property (the one
decomposed). Nesting or some other form of constraints is
in general unavoidable for GR(1) decomposition [2, Prop.5].
However, by the decomposition algorithm itself, the addi-
tional behaviors preserved by using nested GR(1) properties
are unrealizable by the components. This is due to a gap
between what property a formula describes and the realizable
part [31] of that property. We prove below that there are
safety constraints which remove only unrealizable behaviors.
This shows that the decomposition algorithm of [2] can be
applied to always obtain GR(1) contracts in the presence of
full information, simplifying our previous results. Thus, it
can also be applied recursively, for hierarchical designs. In
[2] we proved that refining GR(1) contracts may not exist.
According to the definitions of [2], the GR(1) properties
below yield contract, but not a refining one, because they
restrict property closure. Let d ∈ Nat . We split Def.7 [2]
into two, and omit component actions, because they are
separate from reasoning about liveness.
Definition 5 (Nested GR(1)): Formulae described by
✷
∧
d
m=0∧ (Pm ∧
∧
k∈m..d,l∈0..Hk✷✸¬ηkl)⇒ ✸Qm
∧ Qm ⇒
∧ Ξm
l=0✷✸¬ξml
where Pm ,Qm , ηkl , ξml are state predicates.
Definition 6: A chain condition is
∧∀m ∈ 1..d : ∀ l ∈ 0..Ξm : ∧ Pm−1 ⇒ Qm
∧ ξml ⇒ ¬Pm−1
∧∀m ∈ 0..d : ∧ Qm ⇒ Pm
∧ ∀ l ∈ 0..Hm : ηml ⇒ (Pm ∧ ¬Qm)
∧ ∀ l ∈ 0..Ξm : ξml ⇒ Qm
Proposition 7 (Equirealizability): ASSUME : ϕ is a nested
GR(1) formula (Def. 5) that results from Alg.1 of [2] (so
Pm ,Qm , ηkl , ξml satisfy Def. 6). PROVE : A controller
realizes a property AsmGrnt(I ,E ,S ,ϕ) if, and only if, it
realizes AsmGrnt(I ,E ,S ∧Nxt ,L) where
Nxt
∆
=
∧
m∈0..d((Pm ∧ ¬Qm)⇒ P ′m)
L
∆
=
∧
m∈0..d∧ ∨
∨
k∈m..d,l∈0..Hk✸✷ηkl
∨ ✷✸(Pm ⇒ Qm)
∧ ✷(Qm ⇒
∧
l∈0..Ξm¬ξml)
PROOF SKETCH: By construction from Alg.1 of [2], Pm
is the winning set for the objective ✸Qm ∨
∨
l✸✷ηml .
SUFFICES : conjoining the safety constraint does not remove
realizable behaviors, the rest follows by simple temporal
reasoning. SUFFICES : No state ¬Pm is in the winning set of
✸Qm ∨
∨
k∈m..d,l∈0..Hk✸✷¬ηkl . Since Pm is the winning
set for ✸Qm ∨
∨
l∈0..Hm✸✷¬ηml , it suffices to show that
there are no other winning states. By construction of the
P1 Q1 P0
Q0
η1,0
η1,1
η0,0
ξ1,1
ξ1,0
Fig. 4: An example of a chain condition, with states satisfy-
ing each predicate depicted by patches. Containment means
implication, e.g. |= Q0 ⇒ P0.
η, the component cannot realize any ✸✷ηkl . It remains to
show that the component cannot force the behavior to reach
Pm from ¬Pm . Suppose it did. The last step that enters
Pm must be from a state where it is the environment’s turn
(otherwise Pm contains that state, because Pm itself is a
winning set). All such “environment” states in ¬Pm with a
direct step to Pm are contained in Qm−1 ∧ ¬Pm−1. So at
any of those states, the environment satisfies all the liveness
assumptions ηkl (for all k , l ) and can take a step that avoids
Pm , a contradiction. Thus the winning set is Pm . Therefore,
no controller can step from Pm ∧ ¬Qm to ¬Pm , because
it cannot ensure a return. It would then violate the objective
✸Qm , pending since it stepped out of Pm ∧ ¬Qm .
A delicate point is that we can use specifications of other
components to show that if all components implement the
contract, then the component will return to Pm , but from a
single component’s viewpoint, this objective is unrealizable.
VI. EXAMPLE
We show with an example that the algorithm identifies
variables that we would expect to be redundant information.
An experimental implementation is available [28] under a
BSD-3 license, and implemented using the Python pack-
age omega [24]. The example concerns the interaction of
subsystems in an aircraft with retractable landing gear [2].
Three components are present in this example: an autopilot,
a module that controls the landing gear, and another module
that controls the doors of the landing gear. Table I lists the
variables that model this example’s components. The modes
are landing (m = 0), cruise (m = 1), and takeoff (m = 2),
gears range from retracted (g = 0) to fully extended (g = 5),
and doors from closed (d = 0) to fully open. The constraints
are a stronger version of those in [24], requiring that the
gear shall be extended when in landing mode and below a
threshold altitude, retracted in cruise mode, the doors closed
above a speed threshold, and doors shall be open if gear
not retracted. In addition, the rates at which gear, doors, and
speed change are bounded. The shared invariant is satisfied
by 55576506 states (with the turn index i ∈ 0..2 included).
The two recurrence goals for the autopilot are to enter
cruise and landing mode, ✷✸(m = 1) ∧ ✷✸(m = 0).
The parameterized computation for each of these goals is
performed with different mask parameters, in order to allow
for different communication connectivity. The objectives
are chained by an outer fixpoint that ensures repetition is
possible. Assumptions and guarantees are found in each case.
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TABLE I: Variables in landing gear example
Var Values Represents Controlled by
d 0..5 Doors (closed–open) Door module
g 0..5 Gear position (up–down) Gear module
H 0..4× 103 Altitude Autopilot
s 0..103 Airspeed Autopilot
m 0..2 Flight mode Autopilot
Autopilot
Gear control
Door control
Goal: enter landing mode
door d
gear g
mode m
speed s
Fig. 5: Communicated variables when goal is landing mode.
To enter landing mode from cruise mode, the autopilot must
lower the speed and wait for the doors to open and gear
to exted (generated assumption). For the opposite change
of mode, the autopilot must first reach above the threshold
altitude, where it awaits the gear to retract and doors to close.
The resulting communication connectivity when the goal is
landing mode is shown in Fig. 5. The gear and doors only
need to observe the mode m and speed s , and the autopilot
only the gear state g . Compared to a full communication
graph (10 signals), only 4 suffice for this goal (and no more
for the other goal). Moreover, some variables are entirely
eliminated from component specifications. In particular, the
door module never needs to receive height or mode infor-
mation, and the gear never needs speed information. The
autopilot does not need to observe the door state.
The states that satisfy the shared invariant Inv and from
where the generated assumptions and guarantees ensure that
the autopilot can guide the entire system to repeatedly enter
both landing mode and cruise mode are
∨ ∧ (door = 0) ∧ (gear = 0) ∧ (height ∈ 3001..4000)
∧ (mode ∈ 1..2)
∨ ∧ (door = 5) ∧ (gear = 5) ∧ (mode = 0)
∧ (speed ∈ 0..750)
∨ ∧ (door = 5) ∧ (gear = 5) ∧ (mode = 2)
∧ (speed ∈ 0..750)
∨ ∧ (door = 5) ∧ (height ∈ 3001..4000)
∧ (mode = 2) ∧ (speed ∈ 0..750)
∨ ∧ (gear = 0) ∧ (height ∈ 3001..4000)
∧ (mode ∈ 1..2) ∧ (speed ∈ 0..750)
These were computed as a minimal cover [23] using our
implementation for finding minimal disjunctive normal form
formulae with inequalities over integer variables as conjuncts
(available in omega v0.1.0).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We parameterized GR(1) contract construction with re-
spect to communication architectures, and showed how vari-
ables can be eliminated from component specifications.
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